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Acquisition versus Greenfield Foreign Entry: 
Diversification Mode Choice in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
ABSTRACT 
Departing from the traditional transaction cost approach in diversification mode literature, this 
study investigates the influence of experimental organizational learning on the choice between 
acquisition and a greenfield investment. We provide empirical support that prior experience with 
acquisitions and/or greenfield investments, firm’s predominant international strategy (global or 
multidomestic) and the technological intensity of the parent play a crucial role in subsequent 
diversifications. Furthermore, contrary to extant arguments that foreign ownership decision is 
independent of a diversification mode choice we demonstrate that the type of ownership (joint 
venture vs. wholly owned subsidiary) is a significant predictor of firms’ preference for acquisition 
or a greenfield. Unlike Caves and Mehra (1986) and Larimo (2002) who found a positive 
relationship between acquisitions and full ownership, we show that acquisitions in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) transition economies are unlikely to be wholly owned subsidiaries. In 
addition, we contribute to extant diversification literature by introducing another neglected 
predictor of firms’ diversification strategy: We demonstrate the incremental power of host-





When a multinational enterprise (MNE) decides to invest equity in a foreign country, it faces at 
least two strategically important decisions: firstly, whether to buy an existing foreign entity 
(launch an acquisition)1 or establish a foreign operation from scratch (invest in a greenfield 
facility); and, secondly, whether to do it alone (establish a wholly-owned subsidiary) or involve a 
local partner (create a joint venture). The decision as to whether to opt for a wholly- or jointly-
owned acquisition or greenfield investment carries significant strategic importance due to the 
inherent benefits and risks of each foreign diversification mode. For instance, although 
acquisitions offer a speedy establishment of a local presence, they can be accompanied by post-
acquisition integration failures, which are often rooted in cross-cultural differences and 
technological mismatches. Reversely, although greenfields offer an opportunity to preserve and 
replicate valuable corporate cultures abroad, they require a longer establishment period and more 
time to build business networks locally. In addition, joint ventures enable investors to tap into 
valuable resources of a local partner and minimize investment risks, but they also are at times 
challenging to administer due to the partners’ diverging capabilities, interests and goals. In 
contrast, wholly-owned subsidiaries offer the benefits of managerial autonomy and full control 
over local operations, yet the process of overcoming the liability of foreignness may be difficult 
without the legitimacy of a local partner.  
 Research on patterns and determinants of equity investment modes is abundant yet 
somewhat limited in focus. Some researchers have examined the factors that influence the 
decision to acquire an existing company or establish a greenfield subsidiary (Wilson, 1980; 
Hennart and Park, 1993; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Meyer, 1998; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2002; Belderbos, 2003). Others have taken an 
ownership and control approach to determine the type of entry mode as a wholly-owned or a 
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joint operation (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Brouthers et al., 1998; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999; Davis and Desai, 2000; Pan and Tse, 2000; Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2001; Luo, 2001; Meyer, 2001; Brouthers, 2002). Both streams of research are valuable but 
limited in one important way: A foreign direct investment decision is a complex matter 
concerning both the choice between acquisition or a greenfield investment, and the preference 
for a wholly-owned operation or a joint venture. Only a few studies investigate more than two 
equity investment options: Kogut and Singh (1988), Chang and Rozenzweig (2001), and Elango 
and Sambharya (2004) examine the choice between wholly-owned greenfields, wholly-owned 
acquisitions and joint ventures, but they do not investigate the possibility of jointly established 
acquisitions and greenfields. Caves and Mehra (1986) and Larimo (2002) take a step further by 
including a joint venture or wholly-owned predictor in their analyses of diversification modes. 
The current study makes a contribution to this extant literature on diversification modes in two 
ways. Firstly, we take both diversification and entry mode choice issues on board, and examine all 
equity investment modes: Acquisitions vis-à-vis greenfields, as well as joint ventures versus 
wholly-owned enterprises. Secondly, we test our set of diversification predictors within the two 
entry mode categories, joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries, and conclude that indeed 
the influence of our predictors on the MNEs’ decision to invest in an acquisition or greenfield 
operation does change contingent on the type of ownership.  
 Traditionally, transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975) has been broadly applied to 
diversification mode research (Wilson, 1980; Caves and Mehra, 1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Zejan, 1990; Hennart and Park, 1993; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Larimo, 2002). To enhance the explanatory power of 
transaction cost theory scholars have consequently added cultural variables (Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Barkema et al., 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000) and strategic variables (Harzing, 
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2002). Additionally, to counteract widespread criticisms on the static nature of transaction cost 
theory, some transaction cost adherents have introduced international, regional and country-
specific experience predictors (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). We believe that not the firms’ 
general international experience, but rather their cumulative experience with a particular 
diversification mode influences subsequent choices between acquisitions and greenfields. We 
adopt the organization learning perspective of Cho and Padmanabhan (1999) and Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2001), who study the effect of diversification mode experience on subsequent 
acquisition and greenfield establishments. We complement their diversification experience focus 
by adding two additional organization-learning factors: the MNEs’ predominant international 
strategy, and the MNEs’ technological intensity in related and unrelated investments.  
We further contribute to the extant diversification literature by introducing another 
neglected predictor of the firms’ diversification strategy: We test the effect of the host countries’ 
institutional environment on the investors’ complex decision to invest in acquisitions, greenfields, 
joint ventures or wholly-owned subsidiaries.2 To demonstrate the crucial role of institutions, we 
surveyed a diverse group of western European MNEs that made investments in central and 
eastern European transition economies. The socialist legacy, in addition to recent transformations 
in the host countries, presents an institutional environment that is profoundly different from 
what a typical “western” firm would encounter (Ericson, 1991; Kornai, 1992; Peng, 1994). 
Investors in transition economies have to adapt strategies to an institutional environment in flux 
because the process of change from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy affects 
institutional stability and reliability (Swaan, 1997; Meyer, 2001). Given these differences, 
exploring diversification strategies in transition economies will highlight important strategic 
choices made by firms that operate in different institutional environments (Carroll, 1993; Peng 
and Heath, 1996).       
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 This study is organized as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical foundations and 
develop our hypotheses that predict how the investors’ diversification experience, international 
strategy, technological intensity and ownership preference determine their diversification mode in 
a particular institutional setting. Second, in the methodology section we describe the data 
collection procedures, the measures of our variables and the analytical tools used to test the 
hypotheses. Next, we present the results of our study, followed by a discussion and appraisal, 
including suggestions for future research.     
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Organization learning   
Experience is a primary source of learning in organizations, being deeply embodied in 
organizational memory (Penrose, 1959). According to Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), firms’ past 
experiences transform into organizational routines that consequently create a model for future 
actions and become a source of competitive advantage. They report evidence that neither general 
international experience nor host-country experience can explain the choice between greenfield 
and acquisition diversification modes. The authors argue that these two attributes are more 
important in the decision as to whether or not to undertake a direct investment in the first place, 
or to serve a particular market with a non-equity entry mode. Once the decision to invest in a 
foreign country has been made, international and host-country experience become less important 
than experience with a specific diversification mode (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999).  
In an attempt to reduce the level of inevitable uncertainty involved, a multinational firm 
may imitate “either its own previously successful strategies and structures or those of competitors 
in the new market” (Tallman, 1992). The diversification mode decision could therefore be 
considered as an incremental sequel to a firm’s past successful strategies. Organizations tend to 
persist in the same type of activity over time because they are conditioned to experience 
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successful solutions (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Greve, 2003). If a previous positive experience 
with a diversification mode can be transferred to a new situation, there is a high probability of 
undertaking the same diversification mode investment as a result of this particular experience 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). Companies that typically enter into foreign markets through 
acquisition develop specific skills to efficiently integrate foreign firms, which increases the 
likelihood that these skills will be further exploited in subsequent acquisitions (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). Similarly, because core competences are transferred abroad most efficiently 
through greenfield subsidiaries, there is a high probability that investors with valuable corporate 
cultures will continue to create replicas of themselves abroad. Such path dependencies in 
diversification mode selection commences risk-aversive experiential learning (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). It follows that once a firm undertakes either a successful acquisition or a ditto 
greenfield investment, there is likely to be a significant preference for the same diversification 
mode in the future. Hence, we have 
Hypothesis 1a: The greater prior greenfield experience, the higher the likelihood of a subsequent greenfield 
investment. Conversely, the greater prior acquisition experience, the higher the likelihood of a subsequent 
acquisition. 
However, it is also possible that organizational inertia, in addition to or instead of learning 
processes, could lead to a series of similar diversification modes (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Thus, organizational learning obtained from previous 
diversification mode experience may not always be the reason for the continuation of similar 
market diversification modes, but may rather be due to a denial of the need for change and a sign 
of habitual practice. Furthermore, repetitive international expansions through greenfield 
investments can make investors progressively inert and incapable of appropriately reacting to the 
changing international environment (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). For example, when a firm 
relies on obsolete knowledge to continue its successful international growth strategy, building 
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subsidiaries from scratch becomes “increasingly difficult and unattractive” (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001: 461), so that the need for an acquisition of new practices increases. The complex 
post-acquisition learning process that is initiated by the inevitable adaptation to the new 
circumstances will create a clash between different organizational cultures and ideologies, and will 
eventually eliminate “the rigidities and inertia” by an expansion of the old organizational 
knowledge with new practices and routines (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001: 461). Therefore, the 
more greenfield investments that a company launches, the larger the need for an acquisition. 
Conversely, the more acquisitions firms undertake to increase their organizational knowledge set, 
the greater the need to exploit the accumulated knowledge through greenfield subsidiaries. 
Therefore, we investigate any potential influence of organizational inertia effects. This gives 
Hypothesis 1b:  The greater prior acquisition experience, the higher the likelihood of a subsequent 
greenfield investment. Conversely, the greater prior greenfield experience, the higher the likelihood of a 
subsequent acquisition.   
 
International strategy 
An MNE’s international strategy is a means to exploit the firm’s competitive advantage and 
establish complementary organizational capabilities (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). According to 
the international competitive advantage model of Rugman and Verbeke (1992), global companies 
promote a convergence of consumers’ preferences and strive to maximize standardization of 
production. 3 They benefit from home-country specific advantages, which they export abroad by 
creating “replicas of the parent company” (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), and tunnel down 
strategic decisions on marketing and production to their subsidiaries. Firm-specific advantages of 
global companies are efficiently transferable to foreign locations, thus overcoming natural and 
unnatural market imperfections in foreign markets (Rugman, 1981). Harzing (2000 & 2002) 
found that global companies tend to establish greenfield subsidiaries to ease the transfer of core 
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competencies and exercise tight control over subsidiaries to preserve the parent’s corporate 
culture. 
In contrast, multidomestic firms develop strategies for national responsiveness. Due to 
significant competitive differences between countries, the multidomestic strategy is determined 
by cultural, political and social national characteristics (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Thus, the 
primary objective then is the adaptation of marketing and production strategies to specific local 
customer needs and government requirements. Products and policies conform to different local 
demands and the investor’s activities are usually “tied to the buyer’s location” (Harzing, 1999). 
Taking over a local firm, incorporating its unique corporate culture and benefiting from its local 
business and government relations, is the most efficient way of achieving the goal of local 
knowledge absorption. As a result, multidomestic companies tend to prefer acquisitions as their 
vehicle for foreign market penetration (Harzing, 1999, 2000 & 2002). Thus, different foreign 
market diversification mode choices result from companies’ strategic motivations to either 
exploit home-country competitive advantages or explore host-country competitive advantages 
that complement their unique capabilities for organizational learning and technology transfer. 
From this, we suggest 
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the tendency to follow a global strategy, the higher the likelihood of a greenfield 
investment. 
Hypothesis 2b: The greater the tendency to follow a multidomestic strategy, the higher the likelihood of an 
acquisition. 
 
Technological intensity  
The competitive advantage of technologically intensive firms is deeply embedded in 
organizational practices and their labor force. The most efficient way of transferring such a 
competitive advantage is by establishing a subsidiary from scratch and hiring the right local labor 
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force to subsequently train them accordingly. Often, investments originating from developed 
countries are directed to developing or transition economies. In such cases, technologically 
superior investors acquire local enterprises with weak and outdated technological capabilities. To 
make production facilities competitive, an investor generally needs to make significant post-
acquisition investments to restructure the local enterprise, change its corporate strategy and 
structure, engage in technological modernization, and undertake environmental protection 
measures (Newman, 2000; Meyer, 2001). However, strong inertial forces within the local 
organization might prevent even technologically rational adaptations (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
which puts further burden on the post-acquisition integration process (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998).  
Technology transfer may be particularly difficult in transition economies for two reasons. 
Firstly, the highly turbulent conditions and the consequent uncertainties might encourage local 
managers to resist change and “stick to their old practices” (Villinger, 1996). Therefore, local 
enterprises may not be conducive to successful learning processes (Hedberg, 1981). Secondly, 
because there is likely to be a mismatch not only between the levels of technological 
development, but also between rules, procedures and practices of the foreign investor and the 
local company, the local firm may be forced to take on those of the investor (Levitt and March, 
1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). Before the learning of new routines can occur, the old 
knowledge has to be, in a sense, unlearned by the organization (Hedberg, 1981; Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). The challenge of unlearning old practices and 
routines may be one reason for investors to prefer greenfield diversification modes. Consistent 
with previous research, we therefore propose 
Hypothesis 3a:  The greater the level of technological intensity of the investor, the higher the likelihood of a 
greenfield investment. 
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An exception to this argument could be an investment decision to expand internationally in a 
new line of business. In this situation, a technologically intensive investor might choose an 
alternative diversification mode to satisfy the need for an efficient acquisition of new production-
specific knowledge. A business-diversifying foreign investment can be motivated by various 
arguments. A firm investing in a new line of business could be seeking additional resources to 
develop broader competitive strengths (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001), or may be pursuing 
multipoint competition (Hisey and Caves, 1985). Several researchers found evidence that firms 
investing abroad in a new line of business prefer acquisitions to greenfields (Caves and Mehra, 
1986; Zejan, 1990; Hennart and Park, 1993). This is the result of the firms’ desire to capture 
production skills and management expertise that they do not possess but need for building a 
broader competitive capability. Hennart and Park (1993) present empirical evidence that 
technologically intensive Japanese investors diversifying to obtain new production-specific 
knowledge prefer acquisitions to greenfields, because obtaining additional resources in the market 
in disembodied form tends to be more difficult than acquiring a local firm that already possesses 
them. In effect, international expansion into a new line of business might even create a mitigating 
effect on the potential preference of technologically intensive companies for greenfield 
investment modes. Therefore, we introduce 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the investors’ technological intensity and the greater the dissimilarity between 




Caves and Mehra (1986) and Larimo (2002) do not predict a particular direction in the relation 
between diversification mode and ownership type. The authors argue that the type of foreign 
subsidiary’s ownership is relatively independent of the diversification mode, because it is 
12 
conditioned on the parent’s firm need for control over the subsidiary or on other complex 
reasons “related to the traits of the parent and the activities it undertakes” (Caves and Mehra, 
1986: 463). This argument may hold true in developed economies where firms’ interactions are 
mostly driven by market forces. Business transactions in transition economies, however, are 
heavily influenced by government policies that pursue both market economy transformations and 
a diverse mixture of social objectives.   
Until recently, acquisitions in CEE have only been possible as a part of the privatization 
process (Meyer, 2002). This requires endurance of bureaucratically complex negotiations and the 
involvement of different stakeholder groups, including local government agencies, management 
teams and work councils (Bok and Kulawczik, 1997; Antal-Mokos, 1998). Negotiation partners 
have diverse social objectives, including investment plans for local business development and 
employment guarantees (Estrin, 1994; Meyer, 2002).  Local governments may insist on 
concluding a “staggered divestment” deal to temporary retain a minority stake in the equity for 
the purpose of influencing post-acquisition management decisions, especially regarding employee 
layoffs (Perotti and Guney, 1993). In effect, the investors’ future ownership may remain 
uncertain long after the negotiations are completed (Meyer, 2002).  Therefore, if an exclusive 
control over the foreign operation is of the highest priority, a greenfield investment may well be 
preferred, as full ownership in CEE acquisition deals is often subject to extended negotiations, 
and occasionally may only be possible after a period of shared ownership with a local party. 
Hence, 
Hypothesis 4a: Wholly-owned subsidiaries are likely to be established as greenfields. 




Scott (1995) conceptualizes institutional forces into three groups: regulative, normative and 
cognitive. In this study, we will concentrate exclusively on the effect of regulative institutions on 
the MNEs’ diversification mode choice, because regulative forces are rooted in economics and 
are therefore most commonly studied in international business research (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Brouthers; 2002). Moreover, 
the regulatory process in transition economies in the CEE region are very likely to be an 
influential force in MNE decision-making as to (the mode of) foreign entry. Regulative forces 
include laws and regulations, as well as political and social configurations. In this sense, regulatory 
institutions provide the “rules of the game” in the host country, and the structure in which firms 
have to interact (North, 1990; Oliver, 1997; Davis et al., 2000).4  
Investments in transition economies are generally perceived as risky due to the infested 
perception of local institutional instability. Transition processes involve macroeconomic 
stabilization policies (i.e., government measures to bring inflation under control), restructuring 
and privatization programs (i.e., creation of a viable financial sector, reforming enterprises to gain 
competitiveness, and sustaining a foreign exchange regime that allows for profit repatriation), 
legal and institutional reforms (i.e., establishment of the rule of law, and the introduction of 
competition policies), and liberalization of markets (http://www.imf.org). Furthermore, the CEE 
region has a record of meager resources, lack of reliable monitoring processes and a permanent 
need for infrastructural improvements. Political, institutional and administrative systems in the 
region are democratic but often unstable. In such an insecure environment, investors considering 
a potential acquisition face the challenge of restructuring local enterprises with organizational 
cultures that promote production under centralized instruction rather than market demand, in 
combination with a legacy of production underperformance, consumer neglect, waste of 
resources and lack of innovation. Because of augmented difficulties of post-acquisition 
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integration, we believe that the institutional instability in CEE transition economies may further 
discourage potential acquisitions. Hence, we formulate 





To test the above hypotheses, we conducted an international mail survey among international 
companies from the EU that have invested in ten transition economies in central and eastern 
Europe. We initially selected from the AMADEUS dataset all registered companies based in the 
then 15 members states of the European Union that had at least a ten per cent ownership stake 
in a branch/subsidiary located in any of the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries 
were chosen for this study because they are in various stages of transformation from centrally 
planned- to market economies. Therefore, this set of countries offer a unique opportunity to test 
the extent to which our theoretical arguments and hypotheses, which have largely been used in 
the context of western-style market economies, are applicable to transition economies.  
An English-language questionnaire was created that contained 33 open and closed-ended 
questions. The questionnaire was pilot tested with managers in four Dutch companies who were 
competent in both the English language and their firm’s international expansions into central and 
eastern Europe. Additionally, five well-known international academic researchers reviewed the 
questionnaire, and their comments and suggestions were integrated into a revised version. The 
final English-language questionnaire was then translated into German, French and Italian.5 In 
total 2,798 questionnaires were initially mailed: 35 were returned as non-deliverable, which 
compressed the sample size to 2,763 questionnaires. We received 208 usable questionnaires, 
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representing an overall response rate of 7.5 per cent.6 Table 1 summarizes the number of 
questionnaires sent and responses received by country. Table 2 presents the number of each type 
(acquisition or greenfield) of new investments in branches/subsidiaries undertaken in CEE by 
the responding firms, as well as per industry.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
To test the representativity of our sample, we conducted a t-test comparing the firm size variable 
(number of employees worldwide) of our sample to a random selection of the firm-population, 
which revealed no statistically significant differences in the two means. We also checked our data 
for potential common-method variance. Podsakoff and Organ (1986) argue that if the variables 
in a study all load on one factor or if there is one factor that explains the majority of the variance, 
then common-method variance may be a problem. We performed a factor analysis for all the 
variables used in this study, which resulted in a five-factor solution with the largest factor 
explaining only 16 per cent of the variance. Therefore, it appears that our dataset does not suffer 
from common-method variance.  
 
Measures 
The dependent variable is the EU firm’s latest Diversification mode choice (acquisition versus 
greenfield) into a CEE country, which was obtained with a question as to whether the company, 
in the process of their most recent foreign entry event into a CEE country, had acquired an 
existing local company or whether it had built an operation from scratch. So, diversification 
mode is captured by a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 in the case of an acquisition 
and 0 in the case of a greenfield investment. 
 Our hypotheses relate to six independent variables. First, Diversification mode experience is a 
composite measure obtained by asking the respondents to indicate (a) the number of countries 
worldwide in which their company previously undertook greenfield and/or acquisition 
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investments and (b) the number of times greenfields and/or acquisitions were established. 
Second, International strategy was obtained by asking two sets of multi-scale questions describing 
multidomestic and global strategies. The questions were adapted from Harzing (2000 & 2002), 
who constructed four statements that measure whether international competition in the industry 
of investment is predominantly global and focused on achieving economies of scale or 
multidomestic and aiming at local differentiation. We performed a cluster analysis, which resulted 
in a two-cluster grouping of the four constructs as multidomestic and global, and performed an 
independent-samples t-test to check for significant difference in the mean scores of the two 
groups. Clearly, the profiles of the multidomestic and global strategies are significantly different, 
along the lines expected by the theory (Table 3). The type of international strategy is captured in 
the regressions by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the strategy is predominantly 
multidomestic and 0 if it is predominantly global. Third, in most previous studies, the investor’s 
Technological intensity is obtained from secondary data, often being proxied by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total sales, at either the industry or the firm level (Caves and Mehra, 1986; 
Hennart and Park, 1993; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). It was believed that respondents would 
be unlikely to answer adequately or at all to questions regarding an estimation of the annual sales 
spent on research and development (R&D). We therefore asked a five-point Likert-type of 
question on the percentage of sales spent on R&D (ranging from very low to very high). Fourth, 
to measure Investment relatedness, we asked respondents to answer two five-point Likert-type of 
questions on how related the investment was in terms of both the product line and the line of 
business, respectively. Fifth, to measure the Institutional structure, we created a five-point Likert-
type of scale with questions about the host country’s (a) general stability of political and social 
conditions, (b) barriers to conversion and repatriation of income, (c) level of corruption of 
political leaders, (d) ability of host-country's government to enforce existing laws, (e) efficiency of 
government agencies and institutions, (f) legal restrictions to foreign ownership, (g) government 
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incentives to foreign investments, (h) quality of telecommunication infrastructure, and (i) quality 
of transportation infrastructure. Low values demonstrate institutional stability and efficiency, and 
high values reveal the opposite. We checked for the reliability of the scale using Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient as an indicator of internal consistency (α = .74, which is above the .7 cut-off level). 
Sixth, Type of ownership distinguishes between a joint venture and a wholly owned operation. This 
measure is obtained by separation of our sample in two groups: subsidiaries with 100 per cent 
ownership initially represent the wholly owned operations; the remaining firms are considered to 
be joint operations. For the sake of a robustness test, we created two alternative measures for 
joint ventures: comprising all subsidiaries with 95 per cent foreign ownership and less, and all 
subsidiaries with 90 per cent foreign ownership and less. The empirical analyses did not produce 
different results.   
Finally, consistent with previous research, we included four control variables.7 Relative size 
of investment represents the relative size of the foreign operation, which is measured by dividing the 
initial number of employees of the subsidiary by the number of employees worldwide. Previous 
studies found a positive effect of this variable on the likelihood of acquisition (Caves and Mehra, 
1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Park, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1995; Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2000). Because separate analyses of services and manufacturing sub-samples did 
not produce diverging results, we decided to analyze all firms together and control for the 
investor’s type of activity by introducing an Industry dummy. We control for investment in a 
Production subsidiary because we believe that the decision to invest in a production rather than a 
sales’ outlet is more costly, which might influence the choice between an acquisition and a 
greenfield diversification mode.  We control for a participation in a Privatization program by a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the investment was part of a privatization scheme, and 0 if 
that was not the case.  
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Data analysis 
To explore the influence of the independent and control variables on the likelihood of either an 
acquisition or a greenfield investment, we conducted a binomial logistic regression analysis. This 
statistical method was applied because of the ability of logistic regression techniques to 
incorporate a wide range of diagnostics, the dichotomous characteristic of the dependent, and the 
mix of continuous and categorical independent variables we use (Hair et al., 1995). Since our data 
set is composed of continuous, categorical, single-scale and multiple-scale constructs, all variables 
were converted to standardized z-scores, prior to the analysis. Table 4 shows the means, standard 
deviations and correlation coefficients for all variables under study.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In the binomial logistic regression model that we employed, the regression coefficients estimate 
the impact of the independent (or control) variable on the probability that the diversification 
mode is of the acquisition type (which carries the value of 1). The model can expressed as  
P(Y) = 1/(1+e−z), 
where Y is the dependent variable, and Z is the linear combination of the independent and 











 + … βnXn, 
where β is the intercept, β1…βn are the regression coefficients, and X1…Xn denote the 
independent and control variables.    
We conducted the analysis by creating four models: the first model introduces the 
constant and controls only, and the second model analyzes the influence of all control and 
predictor variables on the likelihood of an acquisition type of entry. The third model tests which 
of our predictors influence the likelihood of an acquisition in a sub-sample of wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and the fourth model demonstrates the relation between the set of predictors and 
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the probability of an acquisition diversification mode in the case of joint venture subsidiaries.8 
The models were estimated with SPSS 11.0, using the maximum-likelihood method.  
The null hypothesis that all coefficients (βs) except β0 are zero, was tested with the model 
chi-square statistical test. We were able to reject the null hypothesis, and could conclude that our 
set of independent variables improved the prediction of the probability of acquisition occurrence, 
because in every tested model the (overall) model chi-square significance was high (p = .0001) 
and the values of –2LL statistics reveal an improvement in the goodness of fit of all models (in 
comparison to the relevant baseline models).  
 
RESULTS 
The results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Hypothesis 1a, is supported, as the coefficient estimates are significant in the predicted direction. 
We find that western European investors with prior greenfield experience are likely to choose the 
same diversification mode in CEE, whilst EU firms with relatively more prior acquisition 
experience are unlikely to establish a greenfield subsidiary. However, to assume that learning 
effects are present when pursuing similar diversification modes in both unrelated and related 
businesses may not be accurate, because following the same investment pattern in related 
businesses could be the result of organizational inertia rather than learning. After dividing our 
sample into related versus unrelated domains, tests on the related sub-sample mirrored the 
findings for the overall sample,9 whereas tests on the unrelated sub-sample reveal a positive and 
significant relationship between prior acquisition experience and the likelihood of a subsequent 
greenfield investment in unrelated businesses.10 This suggests that the more acquisitions a firm 
undertakes in unrelated domains, the more firm-specific knowledge it accumulates, which 
increases the need for greenfield investments so as to efficiently exploit this knowledge. 
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Additionally, we found a negative (although insignificant) relation between prior greenfield 
experience and the likelihood of a subsequent greenfield investment in an unrelated business 
domain. This may imply that when a firm relies on obsolete knowledge to continue its 
international expansion, building subsidiaries from scratch will eventually become difficult, 
creating a dire need for refreshing old practices by acquiring new production and managerial 
techniques. Yet, Hypothesis 1b is not fully supported by our results, probably due to an 
insufficient number of observations.  
The regression results in model 2 support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. This suggests a 
preference of western European companies pursuing a multidomestic strategy for the acquisition 
diversification mode, on the one hand, and a preference of companies with a global strategy for 
greenfield investment into CEE countries, on the other hand. This twofold finding is perfectly in 
line with the global sourcing – national responsiveness tradeoff argument that is central to the 
international strategy debate. On the one hand, if an MNE opts for a global strategy, production 
and managerial strategic decisions, and valuable intangible assets are typically transferred from the 
headquarters to subsidiaries  – hence the preference for a greenfield investment. On the other 
hand, if the MNE pursues a multidomestic strategy, local responsiveness requires local 
knowledge – hence the preference for an acquisition mode. Our international strategy predictor is 
insignificant in both wholly owned and joint venture sub-samples (models 3 and 4) and it’s 
therefore impossible to draw conclusions about the effect MNE’ predominant international 
strategy would have on a particular decision to invest in a wholly owned acquisition vs. a wholly 
owned greenfield, or a jointly owned acquisition vs. a jointly owned greenfield subsidiary. 
The significant and negative sign of the technological intensity variable provides support 
for Hypothesis 3a, indicating a negative relation between the likelihood of an acquisition and the 
technological intensity of the investor firm. It appears that investments from scratch will most 
likely be more appealing to technologically intensive western European firms as a means to 
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effectively transfer and implement sophisticated technology, production and managerial practices 
in CEE. The main effect of the investment relatedness variable supports previous findings, 
implying that investments in related businesses are most likely to be greenfields whilst those in 
unrelated businesses tend to be acquisitions. Yet, the interaction between the technological 
intensity and investment relatedness variables produces unexpected results: we find a significant 
positive relationship between the degree of relatedness of investments by technologically 
intensive firms and the likelihood of an acquisition (the sign of the coefficient is opposite to the 
one predicted). Although, according to extant empirical evidence, technologically intensive firms 
in developed economies acquire unrelated businesses to obtain new production-specific 
knowledge or management expertise, this apparently is hardly the case in transition economies. 
The issue of the investors’ technological superiority over the local firms in CEE has already been 
discussed in detail above. It is very unlikely that an acquisition by a “western” investor in that 
region is undertaken to capture new production-specific knowledge or modern managerial 
expertise. Alternatively, investors may often view acquisitions of local companies as a way to 
conduct the MNE’s current activities in a low-cost environment: the CEE region offers highly 
educated labor at relatively low prices, and in most acquisition cases, an instant access to cheaper 
raw materials due to extant relations with local suppliers. Therefore, we must reject Hypothesis 
3b and conclude that technologically intensive firms investing in related businesses in CEE tend 
to choose an acquisition diversification mode. 
We find support for Hypotheses 4a and 4b, because the coefficient of the joint venture 
predictor is significant and has the predicted sign, revealing a positive relation between joint 
venture entry mode and the likelihood of an acquisition diversification mode. It may be that 
deficiencies in the firms’ knowledge of the local environment constitute a significant competitive 
disadvantage for foreign firms (Hymer, 1976). Involving a local partner for the purpose of 
incorporating its knowledge is more beneficial in acquisitions: acquisitions offer the benefits of a 
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speedy market penetration, but they also entail the risk of not understanding specificities such as 
local consumer preferences and business practices. Joint ventures enable investors not only to tap 
into the valuable resources of a local partner, but also to promptly acquire its local knowledge. 
Reversely, greenfields are not a speedy type of diversification; they require a longer establishment 
period, and therefore can only gradually build local business networks. If an involvement of a 
local partner for the purpose of quick access to valuable resources is not a priority, then wholly-
owned subsidiaries will better suit the investors’ strive for preservation and replication of valuable 
corporate cultures.   
Finally, as far as Hypothesis 5 is concerned, the finding of a significantly negative 
relationship between institutional instability and the likelihood of an acquisition supports our 
hypothesis. Notwithstanding the abundance of empirical support for the negative influence of 
volatile institutional environments on investors’ ownership type (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-
Casseres, 1990; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers, 2002), there has been no empirical 
evidence as to the effect that such an environment may have on diversification mode choices. 
Our data show that acquisitions in institutionally unstable regions are apparently unappealing. 
After all, legal, political and social institutional instability would pose additional burdens on the 
already risky post-acquisition restructuring investments, changes in subsidiaries’ corporate 
strategies and structures, technological modernization programs, and the neutralization of inertial 
forces within the acquired organization. 
The statistical analysis of the two sub-samples revealed interesting results. With the 
exception of three predictors, diversification mode experience and institutional instability, all 
predictors in model 3 are insignificant and unable to predict the likelihood of a wholly owned 
acquisition or a wholly owned greenfield. Technological intensity and investment relatedness are 
significantly and positively related to the likelihood of greenfield in the sub-sample of joint 
ventures. As argued above, the most efficient way to transfer valuable corporate cultures and core 
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competences abroad is by establishing a subsidiary from scratch thus avoiding potential post-
acquisition integration impediments due to technological incompatibility, local firm’s 
organizational inertia, and persistent outdated managerial practices. A significant drawback of 
greenfield investments is the provision of sufficient establishment time, yet the MNE’s 
management typically takes advantage of a longer setting up period to select the best-suited labor. 
As discussed earlier, joint ventures eventually entail additional efforts to administer partner’s 
diverging interests and the extremity of such efforts will largely depend on the cultural (and 
other) differences between the joint venture partners. Because investments in volatile institutional 
environments could be perceived as potentially risky by an investor originating from a developed 
economy with stable institutions, joint ventures with a local partner may be viewed as an efficient 
way to mitigate the intrinsic risk, alleviate the liability of foreignness and provide the MNE with 
the means to smoothly integrate in the substantially different environment. This argument is 
supported by a significant and positive effect of the institutional instability predictor on the 
likelihood of a greenfield diversification in our joint venture sub-sample.  
 
CONCLUSION AND APPRAISAL 
In this study, firstly, we depart from the traditional transaction cost approach to diversification 
mode issues, and demonstrate the significance of three aspects of organizational learning on the 
choice between an acquisition and a greenfield. We empirically support our arguments that prior 
experience with a particular diversification mode, firm’s predominant international strategy and 
the technological intensity of the parent play a crucial role in a subsequent diversification mode 
choice. In so doing, we find support for the argument that an integrative model, including other 
variables than those based on transaction cost theory alone, produces larger explanatory power in 
the area of foreign diversification mode choice, at least in our context of the CEE region. 
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Secondly, we reveal that a host country’s institutional structure does affect not only the 
investors’ ownership strategies, but also their foreign diversification mode choice: unstable 
institutional environments tend to discourage acquisition investments and to encourage 
greenfield establishments. It appears that unreliable institutional structures put additional pressure 
on post-acquisition processes in transition economies where acquired enterprises face 
compatibility problems in the process of adopting parents’ technology, as well as organizational 
inertia. For instance, it is quite likely that local management often resists the pressure to change 
toward modern managerial practices.       
Thirdly, contrary to the arguments of Caves and Mehra (1986) and Larimo (2002) that a 
subsidiary’s ownership is relatively independent of the diversification mode, we empirically 
demonstrate that the ownership type is a significant predictor of an MNE’s diversification mode. 
Unlike the two studies referred to above, which found a positive relationship between full 
ownership and the likelihood of acquisitions, we show that acquisitions in transition economies 
are unlikely to be wholly-owned subsidiaries. Furthermore, by dividing our data in sup-groups of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures, respectively, we demonstrate that the significance 
of our diversification mode predictors is different across both sub-groups.  
This study has several limitations, of course. First, the insufficient number of respondents 
by industry prevents us from investigating in depth industry-level factors that might influence the 
foreign diversification mode decision. Future studies may overcome this drawback by focusing 
on a limited number of industries, investigating detailed industry-specific factors that may 
determine a particular foreign diversification mode preference. Second, the time-range of the 
collected data implies a methodological weakness. Whereas the survey inquired about the latest 
CEE entry, in many cases the time-spread was over five years, which increases the chances of 
recall and memory biases typical of retrospective surveys. A better response accuracy will be 
achieved if future studies avoid surveying firms that have not made relevant investments within a 
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shorter time-period. Third, a number of questionnaires were not entirely completed, so that 
because of these omissions the number of firms included in the analysis is smaller than the total 
number of observations. Fourth, our study is limited to foreign entry decisions by Western 
European MNEs into a pre-selected set of CEE countries. Further work is needed to find out to 
which extent our findings are generalizable to other transition or non-transition countries, and to 
MNEs from other parts of the world. 
Clearly, an organization learning/institutional perspective that take into consideration 
firms’ asset specificity, past diversification experience, international strategy, and accounts for the 
effect of host-countries’ institutional environment offers a better setting for determining 
predictors of diversification mode preferences. Nevertheless, one critical question remains 
unanswered: What is the relative importance of all tested predictors on managerial decision to 
acquire or start from scratch? In what situation will the institutional structure be a more 
important predictor of firms’ diversification choice than MNEs’ past mode-experience or 
predominant business strategy? Furthermore, which of the institutional forces have a greater 
impact on investors’ activities in transition economies, economic volatility, legal systems’ 
differences or political instability? Can we assume that because of the decade-long integration 
programs in CEE, there are hardly any institutional differences between the old and new EU 
members and such differences are in fact only false managerial perceptions? Future research 
studies could achieve in-depth understanding of the diversification and entry mode choices by 
initiating detailed surveys on managers’ decision-making processes and trade-offs in evaluating 






Table 1: International survey response rate 
 







The Netherlands 538 43 8.0% 
Germany 511 49 9.5% 
France 504 30 5.9% 
Belgium 315 18 5.7% 
Italy 263 16 6.0% 
Austria 154 16 10.3% 
United Kingdom 140 10 7.0% 
Sweden 99 7 7.0% 
Finland 93 6 6.4% 
Denmark 81 9 11.0% 
Greece 37 2 5.4% 
Spain 29 1 3.5% 
Luxemburg 7 1 14.0% 
Portugal 7 0 0% 
Ireland 5 0 0% 




Table 2:  Responses by country and industry 
 
Panel A: Greenfield and acquisition entries by host country   
 





Poland 45 21 64 
Czech Republic 24 19 42 
Romania 27 10 40 
Hungary 12 9 21 
Slovakia 5 5 10 
Bulgaria 8 1 9 
Estonia 2 5 7 
Lithuania 7 0 7 
Slovenia 1 4 5 
Latvia 2 1 3 
Total 133 75 208 
 





























Food products and beverages 15 
Textiles, leather and footwear 12 
Wood, pulp and paper products 15 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 24 
Non-metallic mineral products 11 
Machinery and equipment 23 








Wholesale and retail 28 





Table 3: Cluster analysis of strategy variables (scale 1-5)
 
 








Global 3.08 3.78 2.01 2.67 
Multidomestic 2.63 2.05 4.12 3.92 
































































































   


























































































































































   














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: two-tailed tests; dependent variable is acquisition (= 1) or greenfield (= 0); International strategy is 
multidomestic (= 1) or global (= 0). 








Model 3    
Wholly owned  
Model 4        
Joint ventures 
Intercept 10.530    (2.30)  13.633     (3.22) 17.080      (3.76)   9.626    (3.78) 
Industry dummy (manufacturer=1)   0.691     (0.42)   1.876*      (0.76)  1.797       (1.32)   0.877    (1.21) 
Production subsidiary (initially) -1.249**  (0.43) -1.628*      (0.71) -1.586       (1.27) -9.338*   (3.91) 
Relative size of investment 13.272*   (5.26)  3.035**     (1.08)  9.402       (1.71)   
Privatization participation -9.766      (2.30) -10.040      (3.22) -2.022       (3.78)  
Technological intensity  -1.486*      (0.74) -0.023       (1.08)   -3.580*   (1.56) 
Investment relatedness  -3.881*      (1.87) -1.103       (0.70) -12.043*   (4.83) 
Tech. intensity*Inv. relatedness   1.562*      (0.74) -0.070       (1.08)    3.758*   (1.62) 
Greenfield experience  -1.141†      (0.63) -12.205**  (4.60)   -2.776*   (1.19) 
Acquisition experience   4.100***   (1.01)   6.418**   (2.10)  20.934*   (8.36) 
International strategy   1.601*      (0.71)   0.969      (0.89)   -0.887    (1.08) 
Institutional structure  -1.363***  (0.37)  -1.237*    (0.48) -1.552**   (0.58) 
Joint venture (wholly owned = 0)    1.775**    (0.60)   
Cases in the analysis 185  169 93 73 
Overall chi-square 76.950***  123.122*** 68.213*** 61.823*** 
-2LL (baseline in parenthesis) 171.231(248.183)  85.296 (209.418) 40.053 (108.373) 35.381 (97.205) 
Sensitivity 94.6%  91.3% 95.6% 88.9% 
Specificity 52.1%  79.4% 91.6% 82.1% 
Overall % correct 77.8%  86.5% 91.4% 86.3% 




1 The term “acquisition” describes the process of taking an equity stake in an existing foreign 
enterprise that gives the investor a sufficient level of managerial control in the acquired 
organization to guarantee that operational and strategic decision-making power remains with the 
acquiring company (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). 
2 Institutional theory has been extensively tested in entry mode studies, but to the best of our 
knowledge has not been investigated in research on diversification modes (Brouthers et al., 1998; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Davis et al., 2000; Delios and Heinsz, 
2000; Meyer, 2001; Brouthers, 2002; Yiu and Makino, 2002).    
3 This model is based on an interpretation of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s typology (1989). Bartlett and 
Ghoshal describe four strategic types of multinational companies: global, multidomestic, 
international and transnational. We only examine the influence of global and multidomestic 
strategy on the choice between the greenfield or acquisition mode due to a lack of empirical 
support for an impact of the other two strategy types (international and transnational) on 
diversification mode choice (e.g., Harzing, 2002). 
4 Normative forces include values and norms, and cognitive forces are the frames of reality by 
which meaning is made (Scott, 1995).  
5 We did not translate the questionnaire for the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, 
because of their well-known abilities in the English language. Questionnaires in English were also 
sent to Greece, Spain and Luxemburg because their combined share was only three per cent of 
the initial sample. 
6 International mail surveys aiming at an industrial population have a history of vary low response 
rates: Regular mail surveys without a telephone pre-contact or a follow-up achieve response rates 
between 6 and 16 per cent (Dawson and Dickinson, 1988; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993; 
Shiphandler, 1994; Harzing, 1997).  
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7 In our model, we included ten control variables initially. Because of the relatively small sample 
size and the rule of thumb in logistic regression analysis to have at least 30 times as many cases as 
to-be-estimated parameters, we reduced the number of control variables by excluding all highly 
insignificant ones. We excluded the Entry year (B =- .023 and p = .930), Country of origin (B = .057 
and p= .817), Host-industry growth (B=-.184 and p= .417), Cultural distance (B=-.224 and p= .352), 
International experience (B = -.412 and p = .231), and Regional experience (B = .365 and p = .176) 
variables. This did not affect the qualitative pattern of the results.  
8 Our sub-sample of joint ventures had only 73 observations, which made it impossible to run the 
analysis with all the control variables (see the logistic regression rule of thumb in note 7) and 
therefore we removed two of them – relative size and privatization participation.  
9 We removed the control variables from the model and analyzed only the relation between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables Prior greenfield experience and Prior acquisition 
experience. 
10 It must be pointed out that because the vast majority of our observations were related 
investments, we had 145 observations in our related sub-sample and 20 observations in our 
unrelated sub-sample when testing for robustness. In the case of expansions in unrelated 
business, the coefficient of the proxy for experience with acquisitions was significant at the .05 
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